This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-state externalities associated with gun regulations in the context of the gun tra cking market. Using gun tracing data, which identify the source state for crime guns recovered in destination states, we nd that rearms in this market tend to ow from states with weak gun laws to states with strict gun laws, satisfying a necessary condition for the existence of cross-state externalities in the theoretical model. We also nd an important role for transportation costs in this market, with gun ows more signi cant between nearby states; this nding suggests that externalities are spatial in nature. Finally, we present evidence that criminal possession of guns is higher in states exposed to weak gun laws in nearby states.
Introduction
A key issue in the design of federations involves the delegation of authority between national, state, and local governments. A common argument against decentralization hinges on the idea that localities may fail to internalize cross-jurisdiction externalities. Under centralization by contrast, political institutions may help to internalize these externalities. A key argument in favor of decentralization, by contrast, involves diversity in preferences, which can be better accommodated under decentralization by tailoring policies according to local preferences.
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This paper examines these issues, cross-state externalities and heterogeneous policies, in the context of gun policy in the United States. While the federal government has enacted several gun-related policies, states are also heavily involved in this policy arena, with approximately 300 state laws in place as of 1999 (Ludwig and Cook, 2003) . Thus, gun policy is largely decentralized in the United States, and, re ecting the signi cant heterogeneity in preferences, there is signi cant diversity in gun restrictions across states.
In response to federal and state restrictions on gun purchases, a secondary market in guns has emerged. In this market, gun tra ckers supply guns to prohibited persons, those who cannot, according to federal law, purchase rearms from a licensed gun dealer; this group includes convicted felons and minors.
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This market is substantial in size, with ATF investigations into tra cking between July 1996 and December 1998 identifying over 84,000 rearms that were diverted into this secondary market (ATF, 2000) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that this secondary market is characterized by large price markups and has a signi cant interstate component, with one tra cker reporting buying guns on the legal market in Virginia, which has relatively weak gun laws, for $150-200 and re-selling them illegally in New York, which has relatively strict gun laws, for $500-600.
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If the interstate ow of guns responds to di erences in state-level regulations, then gun laws may 1 Among others, see Oates (1972) , Oates (1999) , Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a) , Besley and Coate (1999) , and Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) . In the context of anti-trust policy, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) , who focus on the trade-o between economic e ciency and political participation.
2 See Cook et. al. (2007) for a discussion of this market in the city of Chicago, Illinois. Thus, gun policy in the United States seems to re ect the costs associated with decentralization, namely cross-state externalities, and these externalities are particularly salient when there is signi cant diversity in gun regulations across states. In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical investigation of these issues. As motivated by our tracing data, which provide information on the source state for crime guns recovered in for each of the 50 states, we begin by building a simple supply and demand model of cross-state gun tra cking. On the supply side, potential tra ckers in a destination state choose whether or not to tra c guns, and, conditional on doing so, must choose the source state for purchase. The choice of source state depends upon gun regulations, which increase the cost of tra cking from these states, and transport costs, which are increasing in the distance between the source and the destination state. On the demand side, criminals in the destination state decide, given a price, whether or not to purchase a gun. The key prediction of the model is that increasing the stringency of gun laws in a given source state increases prices and reduces transactions in the secondary market in other states, leading to interstate externalities. A necessary condition for the existence of these cross-state externalities is that tra cking patterns respond to di erences in state-level gun regulations. In addition, given that the model includes transportation costs, any externalities are larger in magnitude when the destination and source state are in close proximity.
Our empirical analysis uses tracing data, as described above, to construct a 50-state gun tra cking import-export matrix. Using these data, our primary empirical analysis is based upon a supply-side analysis in which we condition on a tra cker's decision to sell guns in a given destination state. In particular, our empirical speci cation, which is derived from the theoretical model and is similar to a gravity trade model, relates trade ows between a pair of states to the di erences in the stringency of gun laws between those states.
5 Consistent with the predictions derived from the model, we nd that guns ow from states to weak gun 4 Indeed, policy-makers in restrictive states have argued that tra cking increases criminal access to guns in their states and have attempted to restrict this source of rearms. Mayor Bloomberg, for example, recently led a lawsuit against 15 gun dealers in states with weak gun laws after identifying these dealers as sources of crime guns recovered in New York City.
5 For a review of the literature in international trade on the gravity model, see Anderson (2011). laws to nearby states with strict gun laws. Thus, the necessary condition for the existence of cross-state externalities is satis ed. Building upon this supply-side analysis, we then incorporate a proxy for criminal possession of guns and conduct an equilibrium analysis, which accounts for both the supply side and the demand side. While this analysis requires a number of additional assumptions, it has the advantage of allowing one to quantify the size of any externalities. The results from this analysis suggest externalities are signi cant, with weak gun laws being associated with high possession rates by criminals in nearby states.
Finally, we examine an alternative indicator for tra cking based upon time-to-crime.
The paper proceeds as follows. We rst present background information on relevant federal and state gun laws. We then describe the relevant literature on guns, gun tra cking, and cross-state externalities. As motivated by our tracing data, we then build a simple supply and demand model of gun tra cking. After describing the data, we then explain the econometric strategy, present the results, and conduct several counterfactual experiments.
The conclusion summarizes the results and describes the associated policy implications.
Background on gun laws
The Gun Control Act of 1968 is arguably the most signi cant federal gun control legislation.
Among other things, this law requires dealers to have a license, restricts purchases by prohibited persons, including felons and minors, and generally prohibits the interstate sale of rearms. The Brady Bill, passed in 1994, requires dealers to conduct background checks and thus provides an enforcement mechanism for restricting purchases by prohibited persons.
States supplement these federal laws in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this study, which is focused on cross-state gun tra cking, we consider ten laws deemed signi cant in terms of restricting tra cking, as identi ed by Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). These ten laws are detailed in Table 1A . The rst law parallels federal laws on straw purchasing and thus provides an additional enforcement mechanism. Straw purchasers are individuals who purchase a gun on behalf of someone else, who is often either a prohibited person or a gun tra cker. The next two laws also parallel federal laws and involve either purchasers who falsify information or dealers who do not conduct the required checks. Fourth, some states also have attempted to close the gun show loophole, under which infrequent sellers are not required to conduct background checks. Fifth, some states require prospective gun purchasers to rst acquire a permit to own a rearm, and the application process for this permit typically involves a background check. Sixth, some states allow local authorities discretion to deny concealed carry permits, which are available in some form in every state except Illinois and Wisconsin. Seventh, while convicted felons cannot purchase rearms under federal laws, some states extend this to include those individuals with violent misdemeanors on their record. Eighth, some states require individuals to report lost or stolen guns, attempting to counter the fact that many tra ckers allegedly report that their guns have been stolen after investigations have traced a crime gun back to them. Ninth, some states allow local governments to pass rearms restrictions, whereas localities are preempted from doing so in other states. Tenth, some states supplement ATF inspections of gun dealers. See Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010) for additional information on these state gun laws.
To provide a sense of the cross-state variation in gun regulations, Figure 1 maps an index of state gun laws based upon the total number, from zero to ten, of these gun laws in place, where darker shading indicates more stringent gun laws. As shown, there is signi cant regional variation, with southern and mountain states tending to have weak gun laws, and with states in the upper Midwest and on the two coasts tending to have stricter gun laws.
Despite this regional variation, many state borders are associated with signi cant changes in gun laws, creating potentially strong incentives for gun tra cking. Illinois, for example, has 8 out of the 10 laws described above and is bordered by three states, Indiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin, with relatively weak gun laws.
As an alternative measure, we also consider an index of laws identi ed by the Brady Campaign (2009) as key in curbing rearms tra cking. In particular, the Center has assigned a score to each of 11 laws, with a maximum total of 29 points.
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These laws, as detailed in Table 1B , are focused on regulating dealers, while the laws identi ed by Mayors Against Illegal Guns are more focused on consumers.
Related Literature
The existing literature on gun tra cking within the United States is, similarly to this paper, largely based upon crime gun tracing data. Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn (2001) examine data on guns recovered in 25 U.S. cities and nd that cities in states with mandatory registration and licensing systems tended to import more guns from other states. They also nd that cities in proximity to states without these laws also tended to import more guns. Cook and Braga (2001) analyze tracing data for guns recovered in Chicago, where background checks were already being conducted prior to 1994, and nd a large reduction in guns imported from Brady states, those that were not conducting background checks prior to 1994, after the passage of the Brady Bill. In a study focused on intrastate tra cking, Webster, Vernick, and Bulzacchelli (2009) nd that enhanced regulation and oversight of dealers and private transactions is associated with a reduction in gun tra cking. The tracing data used in this paper are based upon a study by Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). Their key nding is that states with weak gun laws tend to export more guns than states with stricter gun laws.
We build upon this literature in several ways. Most importantly, by building a theoretical model of gun tra cking, we provide micro-foundations for measurement. In particular, the theoretical model generates an econometric speci cation that is based upon correlating trade ows between a given pair of states with the di erence in the stringency of gun laws between this pair of states. To the extent that tra ckers respond to gun laws, then rearms should ow from states with weak laws to states with strict laws. The existing literature, by contrast, has tended to focus on aggregate, jurisdiction-level data. As noted above, for example, Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn (2001) document that cities with strict laws tend to import more than cities with weak laws. By not analyzing the source states associated with these imports, however, their test cannot establish that these imports are from states with weak gun laws, as opposed to being from states with strict gun laws. Thus, their results do not establish that tra ckers respond to di erences in gun laws across states. Similarly, Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010) nd that states with weak gun laws tend to export more than states with strict gun laws. By not analyzing the destination states associated with these exports, however, their test cannot establish that these exports are made to states with strict gun laws, as opposed to being made states with weak gun laws. Given this, their results do not establish that tra ckers respond to di erences in gun laws across states.
In addition to focusing on trade ows, our study makes several other contributions to the literature. We highlight spatial considerations, focusing on the idea that externalities are potentially more signi cant between nearby states than between more distant states.
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By developing an econometric model from micro-foundations, our analysis also allows us to conduct several counterfactuals relating to reductions in incentives for gun tra cking.
Finally, in addition to analyzing tracing data, we also examine the e ects of gun tra cking on the possession of guns by criminals.
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There is also a related literature on the tra cking of weapons at the international level. areas in Mexico with a cartel presence to violence in areas without a cartel presence, before 7 Given our focus on spatial considerations and transportation costs, our paper is also related to a literature on cross-border shopping in other policy contexts. Recent contributions include Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) on gasoline taxes, Lovenheim (2008) on cigarettes, and Knight and Schi (2010) on lottery games. In a study using an empirical strategy similar to that using gun tracing data, Merriman (2010) uses tax stamps on cigarette packs discarded in the city of Chicago and nds that tax rates help to explain the geographic distribution of tax stamps.
8 Given our use of crime data, our paper is also related to a large literature on guns, gun policy, and crime. Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (1998) nd that concealed carry laws have led to a reduction in violent crime. Duggan (2001) uses information on the geographic circulation of a popular rearms magazine as a proxy for gun ownership and nds that guns tend to increase crime. Ludwig and Cook (2000) examine trends in crime rates in states with and without background checks prior to the passage of the Brady bill and nd that background checks had little or no e ects on homicides. Cook and Ludwig (2003) provide evidence that increased gun ownership leads to increased burglary rates. Duggan, Hjalmarsson, and Jacob (2011) nd no relationship between gun shows and subsequent crime rates in the states of California and Texas.
and after the expiration of the assault weapons ban. The results of this analysis also suggest that the availability of assault weapons in the United States increases crime in Mexico.
Model of Gun Tra cking
This section develops a simple equilibrium model of interstate gun tra cking. Given our empirical motivation, we keep the model simple and make speci c functional form assumptions in many cases. It should be clear, however, that the results are robust to other modeling assumptions.
Consider a set of states. In a given destination state d, there is a pool of N potential tra ckers, which are indexed by t. Tra ckers supply guns to criminals in d and can purchase domestically (g td = d), purchase from another source state (g td = s 6 = d), or not purchase (g td = 0). The non-travel costs associated with purchasing from source state s is given by + r s X s s , where r s indexes the stringency of the regulatory policy in s; the parameter , which is hypothesized to be positive, re ects the sensitivity of these costs to the regulatory policy, and X s and s capture observed and unobserved, respectively, cost di erences across states. Travel costs, which equal zero for domestic purchases, are represented by the increasing function h(t ds ), where t ds represents travel distance. With an additional idiosyncratic component " tds , a purchase of a gun in source state s by a tra cker that is re-sold in d at a price of P d yields a surplus equal to:
where ; which is hypothesized to be positive, captures the responsiveness of tra ckers to the price in destination state d. The payo to a tra cker from not purchasing a gun is normalized to equal V td0 = " td0 : If " tds is distributed type-I extreme value, then the probability of a tra cker t from destination state d purchasing in source state s equals:
In terms of the demand size, we assume a pool of n criminals, indexed by c; in destination state d. Criminal c is willing to pay " cd for a gun, which follows the distribution function F and density f . Thus, given a price P d ; the aggregate demand for guns in state equals
In equilibrium, prices are set such that the aggregate supply of guns to d from all possible source states equals the aggregate demand for guns in d:
where N is the number of tra ckers on the supply side and n is the number of criminals on the demand side.
Then, considering an increase in the stringency of gun policies in a given source state s, it can be shown that:
where Q d is the equilibrium quantity in destination state d: As shown, under the hypothesized signs of the parameters, increasing the stringency of gun laws in source state s leads to an increase in the equilibrium price and a decrease in the equilibrium quantity in the secondary market in state d . Thus, a necessary condition for such cross-state externalities in gun policies is that tra ckers respond to di erences in gun laws across states ( > 0). Given this, the main focus of the empirical analysis involves estimation of the sign and magnitude of this parameter :
The model also highlights the role of travel distance in these policy externalities. In particular, we have that the ratio of domestic responses to foreign policy changes (s 6 = d),
relative to responses to domestic policy changes (s = d), can be expressed by:
Thus, under the assumption that travel costs are increasing in travel distance, cross-state externalities, when considered relative to the domestic e ects of policies, are more signi cant when the two states under consideration are in close proximity. Thus, an additional focus of the empirical analysis involves the role of distance in trade ows.
Given the importance of the parameter governing the responsiveness of supply to gun laws ( ) and travel distances, our primary empirical analysis focuses on the supply side via an examination of the ow of guns across states in tracing data. In addition to estimating these key parameters, the supply-side analysis allows us to measure the degree to which state gun laws are weakened by tra cking resulting from weak gun laws in other states.
Supplementing this analysis, we then attempt to measure criminal possession of guns, which can be considered as a proxy of equilibrium quantities. This allows us to estimate both supply-side and demand-side parameters and to thus quantify the externalities associated with weak gun laws in other states increasing criminal possession of guns, as highlighted in equation 5.
Data and Selection Issues
To shed light on the cross-state externalities associated with gun tra cking, our main data source involves information from crime gun tracing. Although the raw data are not publicly available, the ATF recently released state-level aggregate data for the calender year 2009, and these data were subsequently posted on the website www.tracetheguns.org. For a given destination state, these data include the number of guns recovered from crime scenes that were successfully traced to a given source state. Thus, using these data, one can construct the full 50-state gun tra cking import-export matrix, with about one-third of traced guns originally purchased in other states. Our analysis excludes Hawaii and Alaska but includes the District of Columbia and is thus based upon 49 source and 49 destination states, for a total of 2,401 trade ow observations. In total, about one-third of these traced guns were purchased in other states, suggesting that cross-state externalities are signi cant.
There are three important selection issues associated with interpreting these tracing data as representative of the pool of guns possessed by criminals. First, not all guns involved in crimes are recovered by the police. One important implication of this is that crimes involving weapons, which are recovered by de nition, are likely to be over-represented. Indeed, as shown in Appendix Statistics from New York City also show that those convicted of felony gun possession, when compared to other felons, were more likely to be re-arrested, their re-arrests were more likely to involve violence, and they were four times more likely to be arrested for homicide.
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Finally, the tracing procedure only allows local police to list a single type of crime. It is possible that many weapons charges were made simultaneously with other charges, and it is natural that police submitting the trace request would list the weapons charge, rather than the other crime.
The second selection issue involves the fact that tracing policies vary across jurisdictions, with some jurisdictions submitting all guns recovered for tracing, and others submitting guns only for investigative purposes. One important implication of this second selection issue is that some jurisdictions in states with strict gun laws may rst check state-level records, such as purchaser permit databases, before submitting their tracing requests to the ATF. This may lead to states with strict gun laws having an arti cially high number of out-of-state traces. As described below, we address this concern by including destination state xed e ects in one of our speci cations, and, in this case, the model is identi ed solely by the distribution of out-of-state traces and the associated gun laws across source states.
The third selection issue involves the fact that not all guns submitted for tracing are successfully traced to a source state. In 2009, of the roughly 240,000 guns that were submitted for tracing, only 145,000, or 60 percent, were successfully traced. There are a variety of reasons why a gun may not be traced. First, dealers are only required to keep records for 20 years. Second, in some cases, the serial number on the gun has been obliterated. While we do not have any systematic information on guns that were not successfully traced, there
were not signi cant discrepancies between states in terms of the fraction of guns that were successfully traced (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2010).
We supplement these tracing data with information on state gun laws. Our baseline estimates are based upon an index of 10 guns laws, as described above, in Mayors Against
Illegal Guns (2010), and we also estimate speci cations in which we allow for each law to have
an independent e ect. To capture the importance of spatial proximity, as suggested by the model, we also incorporate information on the distance between every state, as measured by the number of miles between the geographic centroids of the two states. As control variables, we also include measures of state size, in terms of both square miles and population.
Supply Side Analysis
Our primary empirical analysis focuses on role of state gun laws in the ow of guns across states. This analysis tests the simple prediction of the model that tra cking ows between any two states depend upon gun laws in the source state, gun laws in the destination state, and the proximity of the two states.
Since these tracing data do not include information on non-purchases, this analysis focuses exclusively on the supply side and the corresponding theoretical probability that, conditional on supplying a gun to state d (g cd 6 = 0), a tra cker in destination state d purchases a gun from source state s. This is given by:
Note that, since this analysis is conditioned on the decision by a tra cker to supply a gun to state d, these key expressions are independent of the price of guns (P d ) in state d. This is helpful from our perspective as we are not aware of any systematic state-level data on prices in this market.
For empirical purposes, we parameterize travel costs as h(t dk ) = 1(t dk > 0) + t dk dk : The rst term applies only to out-of-state purchases and is intended to capture potential exposure to federal gun laws when re-selling guns across state lines. The second term captures the increase in travel costs associated with increases in travel distance. Finally, dk captures unobserved costs associated with tra cking guns between states s and k.
Then, letting m ds denote the imports from s from d; as represented in the tracing data, assuming a su ciently large sample of recovered guns, we have that:
Combining equations (7) and (8) and taking logs, we then have the key estimating equation:
As shown, under the hypothesis that > 0 and > 0, the ow of guns from source state s to destination state d (m ds ); relative to in-state purchases (m dd ); is increasing in the stringency of gun laws in the destination state, is decreasing in the stringency of gun laws in the source state, and is decreasing in the distance between the source and destination states. Finally, the constant in this regression, which is based upon a comparison of foreign sources to domestic sources, identi es ; which is the cost associated with importing guns from any state, relative to in-state purchases. Table 2 present our preliminary results from estimation of equation (9) via OLS. In particular, we regress the left-hand side of (9) on distance, in thousands of kilometers, and the di erence in the stringency index between the source and destination states. Since the original index varies between 0 and 10, this di erence varies between 10 and 10. Standard errors are clustered at the level of both source and destination state.
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As shown in column 1, the di erence between the source and destination stringency index has the expected sign, with increasing stringency in the source state leading to reduced trade ows and increasing stringency in the destination state leading to increased trade ows, and this coe cient is statistically signi cant at the 99-percent level. Also, the distance between the two states has the expected coe cient, with increases in distance associated with a reduction in trade ows, and this coe cient is again statistically signi cant. In terms of comparing these two key coe cients, an increase in the stringency index of one point (i.e.
one additional law) in the destination state is equivalent to moving the source state closer by about 230 kilometers. In terms of the other control variables, larger states, in terms of population, are more likely to export and less likely to import. We nd no corresponding relationship in terms of state square miles. Finally, the constant is negative and statistically signi cant, highlighting the fact that around two-thirds of all traced guns were originally sold in the destination state.
While the regression in column 1 restricts source and destination laws to have equal and opposite e ects, the speci cation in column 2 relaxes this restriction. As shown, the two coe cients have the hypothesized signs, with increases in the source stringency index reducing trade ows and increases in the destination stringency index increasing trade ows.
In column 3, we relax the assumption that every law in the index of 10 laws has the same e ect.
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As shown, the laws that have the hypothesized negative e ect include straw purchaser liability, required reporting of lost or stolen guns, and local discretion over gun regulations.
Additional speci cations
The baseline speci cation, as reported in Table 2 , is identi ed by two distinct sources of variation. First, to the extent that gun laws matter, then states with strict gun laws should purchase less domestically and import more from other states. That is, the key coe cient on gun laws is identi ed in part by the correlation between destination state gun laws (r d ) and the propensity to purchase domestically (m dd ): Second, to the extent that gun laws matter, then, all else equal, a given destination state should import more from states with weak gun laws. That is, the key coe cient on gun laws is identi ed in part by the correlation between source state gun laws (r s ) and the propensity to import from that state (m ds ): Since,
12 Each of these laws is measured as source less destination and thus takes on three possible values ( 1, 0, and 1).
as noted above, not all crime guns are submitted for tracing, it could be that states with strict gun laws rst check state-level databases before submitting a gun for tracing, and this may induce an arti cial correlation between destination-state gun laws and the propensity to purchase domestically. Given this, we next present a speci cation with destination state xed e ects. By subsuming all variation that is constant at the level of the destination state, this speci cation is identi ed solely by the second source of variation described above. That is, this analysis is identi ed solely by the distribution of out-of-state traces across source states. As shown in Table 3 , which reports results from a xed e ects speci cation, the results are broadly similar to those in Table 2 , with states importing more from other states with weak gun laws than from other states with strict gun laws. Similarly, as shown in column 3, states tend to import more from source states with straw purchaser liability and those that require reporting of lost or stolen guns.
As an additional robustness check, we next estimate a rst-di erenced speci cation. In particular, we examine the di erence between trade ows, for a given pair of states, from source to destination and trade ows from destination to source:
As shown, distance, which is identical in the two equations, drops out of this rst-di erenced speci cation. More generally, any measure, whether observed or unobserved, that plays an identical role in source-to-destination and destination-to-source observations, is di erenced out in this speci cation. As shown in column 1 of Table 4 , the results are broadly similar to those in Table 2 , with guns owing from states with weak gun laws to states with strict gun laws. The results are similar in column 2, with strict states both importing more and exporting less. Finally, the results in column 3 are similar to those in the baseline speci cation, although two additional laws, falsifying purchaser information liability and local discretion to deny carry permits, now have a statistically signi cant e ect on trade ows.
One potential alternative explanation for our baseline results involves interstate migration. While we have interpreted our baseline results as re ecting tra cking ows, it is possible that these patterns in the data simply re ect population ows. Table 5, we indeed do nd a positive correlation between gun tracing patterns and migration ows, suggesting that some of the out-of-state guns recovered may be due to migration. After controlling for these ows, however, the role of the gun laws is quite similar and, if anything, suggests a stronger role for gun laws than does the baseline speci cation.
As an additional robustness check, we next present results using the tra cking index reported by the Brady Campaign. As shown in Table 6 , the results are broadly similar to those in Table 2 , with crime guns owing from states with strict gun laws to states to weak gun laws. As the index varies from a minimum value 0 to a maximum of 29, the coe cient on the index is smaller, when compared to the coe cient in Table 2 , which is based upon an index that varies from 0 to 10. As reported in column 3, store security precautions, ballistic ngerprinting, and mandatory reporting of lost rearms have the expected negative e ect on trade ows. States that limit the purchase of handguns to one per month but with two or more exceptions, by contrast, have an unexpected positive e ect on trade ows.
A commonly noted problem associated with the multinomial logit model involves unrealistic substitution patterns, which follows from the assumption that the unobserved surplus associated with tra cking (" tds ) are independently distributed across source states.
14 In the context of our application and, as expressed in our baseline speci cation, an increase in the stringency of gun laws in a given source state leads to an increase in trade ows from every other state that is proportional to the baseline level of imports. It might be more rea- controlling for the log of the within-group market share on the right-hand side. As shown in Table 7 , we do nd evidence of a within-group correlation, as expressed in the positive coe cient on the within-group share. After controlling for this within-group share, however, the e ects of gun laws are broadly similar to those in our baseline speci cation.
Note that over 20 percent of observations involve zero trade ows, and, given our loglinear speci cation, these observations are not included in the baseline results. We have attempted to address this issue in two ways. First, using our baseline speci cation in Table   2 , we add one to all imports. The results from this speci cation, as shown in Table 8 , are similar to those in Table 2 . Second, using our baseline speci cation in Table 2 , we drop the 13 smallest states in terms of both imports and exports. These states account for over 80 percent of the zero trade ows, and the remaining sample has only 5 percent of observations involving zero trade ows. As shown in Table 9 , the results from this speci cation are similar to those in Table 1 .
To summarize, our baseline results are robust to the inclusion of destination state xed e ects, a rst-di erenced speci cation, controls for interstate population migration, an alternative index of state gun laws, a nested logit speci cation, and two methods for handling the large number of zero trade ows in our data.
Tra cking and Weakening of State Gun Laws
The baseline parameter estimates can be used to estimate the degree to which gun policies are a ected by gun laws in other states. To shed light on this issue, we rst conduct a counterfactual experiment in which incentives for interstate gun tra cking are eliminated in the sense that all source states adopt the gun laws in place in a given destination state.
Under this counter-factual, we then calculate the degree to which states could change their gun laws in order to match the real-world supply conditions. For states with strict gun laws, this exercise rst considers an inward shift in the supply curve associated with the reduction of imports as all source states adopt the strict laws of the destination state, followed by an equivalent outward shift in supply as regulatory policies are weakened in all states. By shifting supply back to its original position, equilibrium prices and quantities are unchanged, and this analysis is thus independent of the shape of the demand curve. For states with weak gun laws, by contrast, this exercise rst considers an outward shift in supply followed by an inward shift as regulatory policies are strengthened.
More concretely, shutting down the stochastic components of the model and calculating the gun laws in state d in the absence of incentives for tra cking (r 0 d ) that would match observed supply, we have that
Solving for these counterfactual gun laws (r 0 d ), we have that:
To get some intuition for this index, consider a special case. In particular, if transportation costs, as measured by h(t dk ); are very large for all source states k 6 = d, then there are no imports into state d, policies are neither weakened nor strengthened by tra cking, and counterfactual policies are equal to actual policies (r
More generally, counterfactual policies will be weaker than actual policies when a given destination state is exposed to states with weak gun laws and stronger when exposed to states with strict gun laws.
The results from this exercise are reported in small states being more a ected by tra cking. Indeed, the largest e ects are in the District of Columbia, which has a very small population.
In summary, this supply-side empirical analysis provides support for the two predictions of the model. That is, guns tend to ow from states with weak gun laws to nearby states with strict gun laws, and these results are robust to a number of alternative speci cations. Using these parameter estimates, we then demonstrate that gun laws are signi cantly a ected by inter-state tra cking, and any weakening of gun laws is particularly salient in states with strict guns laws, those in close proximity to states with weak guns laws, and in smaller states.
Equilibrium Empirical Analysis
Building upon this analysis of the supply side, we next present two speci cations that also account for the demand side. The rst analysis assumes a xed price, and the second analysis allows for a general price elasticity of demand. These analyses have the bene t of allowing for the computation of equilibrium criminal possession of guns under various counterfactuals.
But, as will be seen below, both of these analyses require additional assumptions from both a speci cation and identi cation perspective and also require data on baseline criminal possession of guns at the state level.
Fixed Price Analysis
Our rst speci cation incorporates information on the demand side but makes the simplifying assumption of a xed price. That is, all criminals in state d are willing to pay price P d ; this assumption is equivalent to assuming a perfectly elastic demand curve. While prices are assumed to be xed under this assumption, quantities are determined in equilibrium and are driven by the supply side.
Under this assumption and the parameterization of travel costs used above, we have that the equilibrium probability that a tra cker purchases a gun in source state s and re-sells in destination state d is given by:
Let d0 denote the fraction of criminals not possessing a gun. Then, the number of criminals not possessing a gun is given by m d0 = [ d0
, where P k m dk represents the number of guns recovered in destination state d. Then, assuming a su ciently large sample of recovered guns and recalling that the observed surplus from not tra cking a gun is normalized to zero, we have the key estimating equation:
By comparing imports from state s into destination state d to the decision to not tra c, this speci cation now depends upon the price of a gun (P d ). Since this price is xed by assumption, however, it can be estimated by a destination state xed e ect. This is helpful since we do not have any data on prices in the secondary market. Also, the parameter is identi ed in this estimation by comparing the number of guns imported from other states to the number of guns purchased domestically. A model justifying this proxy is one in which criminal decisions to commit robberies are independent of gun possession, and criminals commit robberies with guns should they possess a gun and with another weapon otherwise. Of course, there may be reasons to believe that this is not the correct model of criminal behavior. Given the log-linear speci cation, however, the key coe cients are unchanged under a model in which possession of a gun makes individuals more (or less) likely to commit a crime, and only the constant of the regression is a ected.
16 Thus, the analysis is robust to alternative models of criminal behavior. Table 11 presents the results from this analysis. As shown, the inclusion of information on criminal access to guns changes the results only slightly, with the parameter estimates in column 1 similar to those in the baseline results in Table 2 . In column 2, which relaxes the assumption that every law in the index of 10 laws has the same e ect, the results are again similar to those in Table 2 .
Using these parameters, we next compute criminal possession of guns under a counterfactual scenario in which incentives for tra cking are eliminated. In particular, we consider a scenario in which domestic policies are xed and are adopted in every other state as well.
For example, from the perspective of New York states, every state adopts 10 out of 10 gun laws in the index, thereby eliminating incentives for tra ckers to travel to states with weak gun laws in order to purchase guns. Under this counterfactual, we then re-compute criminal possession of guns and compare this to the baseline criminal possession of guns, as predicted by our model. As shown in Table 11 , the e ects are again most signi cant in states with strict guns laws, in close proximity to states with weak gun laws, and in small states. From a proportional perspective, the largest declines are in DC, Rhode Island, and New Jersey.
Possession rates increase in states with weak gun laws, as disincentives for tra cking from other states are eliminated. West Virginia, for example, has very weak gun laws and is surrounded by states with stricter guns laws. Thus, criminal possession in this state increases from 20 percent to 23 percent when all states adopt West Virginia's gun laws.
Full equilibrium analysis
Finally, we present a speci cation in which we estimate both supply-side and demand-side parameters. Importantly, this speci cation allows for the possibility that demand is perfectly inelastic. In this special case, increasing the stringency of gun laws in other states will increase prices but will not reduce equilibrium quantities even if tra cking ows respond to 16 That is, assume that individuals commit robberies with probability Q if they possess a gun and with probability q if they do not possess a gun. Then, the dependent variable in our regression will be ln (Qm ds ) ln(qm d0 ). Separating Q and q and substituting in equation (14), we have ln (Qm ds ) ln(qm d0 _ ) = ln(Q=q) + ln(m ds ) ln(m d0 ) = ln(Q=q) + + P d r s + X s 1(t ds > 0)
di erences in policies. Thus, in this special case, there are no cross-state externalities in the sense that a weakening of gun laws in a given state does not increase criminal possession of guns in other states.
In particular, we assume that, given a price P d , criminal c in destination state d purchases a gun with the following probability:
where ; which is hypothesized to be positive, captures the responsiveness of criminal purchasing decisions to prices, and d represents unobserved demand for guns in state d. Again, if demand is perfectly inelastic ( = 0); then an increase in the stringency of gun laws may increase prices but will not reduce possession rates.
For tractability considerations, we next assume that the number of criminals (n) is equal to the number of tra ckers (N ). In this case, equating supply, as expressed by the left-hand side of equation (3), and demand in equation (15), one can solve for equilibrium possession rates as follows:
where e d = ln
is an e ective stringency index of the regulatory policy in d, accounting for both domestic and foreign gun laws. 17 As shown, a regression of possession rates on the e ective stringency index uncovers a combination of demand-side ( ) and supply-side ( ) parameters. Under the hypotheses that > 0 and > 0; criminal possession of guns in equilibrium is declining in the e ective stringency index.
To provide some interpretation for the e ective stringency index, consider rst the special case where h(t dk ), which can be interpreted as the cost of importing from any state, is very externalities. More generally, when transportation costs are low, this index will depend upon both domestic and foreign policies, and an increase in the stringency of gun laws in a given source state will have external e ects in the sense of reducing criminal possession rates in other states.
In terms of empirical implementation, the key thing to note here is that the deterministic component of this e ective stringency index e d can be computed with information on the key parameters from our baseline supply side analysis, as reported in Table 2 . That is, shutting down the stochastic component, using the speci cation for transportation costs, and using the parameter estimates in Table 2 , we compute b e d = ln
and use this in a cross-state regression of possession rates on e ective stringency indices. Table 13 presents the results from this analysis, using the measure of criminal possession of guns, as described above, based upon robbery data. As shown in column 1, which reports the results from a 49-state OLS analysis, possession rates are declining in the stringency index. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of an elastic demand curve and suggests that state gun laws have externalities in the sense that an increase in the stringency of gun laws in a given source state reduces criminal possession rates in other states, and especially so in nearby states.
A key concern in interpreting this coe cient in column 1 involves policy endogeneity.
In particular, if unobserved criminal demand for guns among criminals ( d ) is correlated with gun regulations (r d ), then the estimates in column (1) will be biased. In terms of the direction of any bias, however, one plausible scenario is that states in which criminal possession is otherwise high will tend to enact strict gun laws to counteract this problem. In this case, policy endogeneity would tend to move the coe cient on the stringency index in a positive direction, and, if anything, this endogeneity will tend to understate the hypothesized negative e ect of state gun laws on criminal possession rates.
To address this issue empirically, we next control for the domestic stringency index. That is, we calculate the stringency index under the assumption of no-tra cking.
18 Controlling for this domestic stringency index, we then use the variation induced by laws in neighboring states. Intuitively, we compare criminal possession rates in two states with similar laws but with di erent laws in neighboring states. According to our hypothesis, possession rates should be higher in the state surrounded by other states with weak gun laws. As shown in the second column of Table 12 , this is indeed the case. That is, after controlling for domestic laws, the e ective stringency index has an even stronger e ect on criminal possession rates.
This suggests that the endogeneity on gun laws in the destination state is not driving our results.
Using these parameter estimates, we next conduct counterfactual scenarios analogous to those in Table 12 . We rst consider a counterfactual scenario in which gun laws are xed but in which incentives for tra cking of rearms are eliminated.
19 Table 14 reports the results from this counterfactual. As shown, possession rates fall in states with strict gun laws but increase in states with weak gun laws. The largest proportional declines are again in states with weak gun laws, states surrounded by states with weak gun laws, and in small population states. These include, for example, DC, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
To summarize, the results from this equilibrium empirical analysis suggest that gun laws in other states in uence criminal possession of guns. While these analyses require additional assumptions and the full equilibrium analysis is limited by its reliance on purely crosssectional data, the consistency of the results with the predictions of the theoretical model is encouraging.
Time-to-Crime Analysis
While the tracing data are useful for detecting inter-state tra cking, they are necessarily an indirect measure of tra cking. Given this, we follow the existing literature by also analyzing an additional proxy for tra cking known as time-to-crime, de ned as the time elapsed between the initial purchase of the gun and its recovery at a crime scene.
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In particular, the literature has argued that guns with a short time-to-crime, typically measured as less than two years, is a strong indicator of tra cking.
Following Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010), we correlate an index of gun laws with the fraction of recovered guns by source state that have a time-to-crime of less than two years. As shown in Figure 2 , the fraction of recovered guns with a short time-to-crime varies from under 10 percent from guns originally purchased in New Jersey to 40 percent for guns originally purchased in Missouri.
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More importantly, there is a strong and statistically signi cant correlation between gun laws and time-to-crime. In terms of the magnitude of this e ect, these results suggest that states with the weakest laws have approximately 25
percent of guns with a short time-to-crime, whereas states with the strictest laws having only 15 percent.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-state externalities associated with state-level gun regulations. This analysis yields three key results.
First, tra cking ows respond to gun regulations, with guns imported from states with weak gun laws into states with strict gun laws. Thus, the necessary condition for cross-state externalities is satis ed. The second key result is that proximity matters, with tra cking ows more signi cant between two nearby states than between two distant states. Thus, any externalities have a spatial component, with a weakening of gun laws having a more signi cant e ect in nearby states. The third key result is that, consistent with the existence of cross-state externalities, criminal possession rates tend to be higher in states exposed to weak gun laws in other states.
These ndings of cross-state externalities have a number of policy implications. First, to the extent that states do not internalize these externalities when setting gun regulations, gun policy may be too lax under decentralization. This idea is consistent with the standard result of ine cient policies under decentralization and cross-state spillovers. Second, there may be a role from a welfare perspective for increasing the stringency of federal regulations.
For example, federal laws equivalent to those in New York would eliminate incentives for tra cking into this state. On the other hand, there would be a cost of further federal interventions, as a key advantage of decentralization involves the ability of states to tailor policies according to local preferences. While our analysis sheds light on this bene t of greater centralization, weighing these bene ts and costs would require information on the value of policies being tailored to local preferences under decentralization. There are limits on bulk purchasing, but state law contains certain exceptions. 3 ballistic fingerprinting 5 required microstamping on semi-auto handguns "Microstamping" is used to record information about the gun (i.e. make and serial number) on its firing pin. When the gun is fired, the information is transferred to the spent cartridges, allowing for a cartridge to be linked to the gun from which it was fired. 5 mandatory reporting of lost/stolen guns (firearm owners) 3 
